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Complex operations encompass stability, security, transition and recon-
struction, and counterinsurgency operations and operations consisting of 
irregular warfare (United States Public Law No 417, 2008). Stability opera-
tions frameworks engage many disciplines to achieve their goals, including 
establishment of safe and secure environments, the rule of law, social well-
being, stable governance, and sustainable economy. A comprehensive 
approach to complex operations involves many elements—governmental 
and nongovernmental, public and private—of the international community 
or a “whole of community” effort, as well as engagement by many different 
components of government agencies, or a “whole of government” approach. 
Taking note of these requirements, a number of studies called for incentives 
to grow the field of capable scholars and practitioners, and the development 
of resources for educators, students and practitioners. A 2008 United States 
Institute of Peace study titled “Sharing the Space” specifically noted the 
need for case studies and lessons.  Gabriel Marcella and Stephen Fought 
argued for a case-based approach to teaching complex operations in the 
pages of Joint Forces Quarterly, noting “Case studies force students into the 
problem; they put a face on history and bring life to theory.” We developed 
this series of complex operations teaching case studies to address this need. 
In this process, we aim to promote research and to strengthen relationships 
among civilian and military researchers and practitioners. 
The Center for Complex Operations (CCO) emphasizes the impor-
tance of a whole of government approach to complex operations and pro-
vides a forum for a community of practice and plays a number of roles in the 
production and distribution of learning about complex operations, includ-
ing supporting the compilations of lessons and practices. 
Dr. Karen Guttieri at the Naval Postgraduate School provided the 
research direction and overall leadership for this project.
Center for Complex Operations, National Defense University, Washington, DC 20319.
Produced 2010.  Material in this case study may be used without permission.
Note: The views expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Defense 
University.
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The Road to Good Intentions: 
British Nation-building in Aden
Scott Smitson
Our period of occupation did the country little permanent good, for all the self-
less work of many devoted Englishmen and so many good intentions. Whatever 
the rights and wrongs of the way we left, whatever was to come after us, the time 
for us to be there was over. And if we were to go, it was better not to linger on.
Sir Humphrey Trevelyan, last high commissioner of the 
Federation of South Arabia
The weathered, ancient heart of the Middle Eastern city had been a center of 
trade, bazaars, and merchant activity for centuries. Throughout its history, 
this urban district had witnessed countless influences from traders from 
across the Middle East region, bringing with them unique cultural and social 
contributions to a vibrant, cosmopolitan crossroads of religions, empires, 
and cultures. But on this day, the neighborhood would be the scene of a vio-
lent clash between insurgents, western troops, and local police authorities, 
who, though trained and nominally allied with the western forces, turned 
their weapons on their supposed allies. Starting with an ambush of a supply 
convoy, this battle would evolve into a violent episode of urban conflict, 
punctuated by sniper fire, grenade barrages, and machine gun exchanges. 
Unable to differentiate friendly forces from enemies, the foreign troops were 
surrounded by a lethal enemy that blended in with the civilian population 
that used schools, homes, and mosques as cover. Many of the western forces 
were killed by some of the very security forces they had spent years training, 
mobilizing, and equipping. By the evening of the battle, insurgent forces had 
taken control of the heart of the city, violently expelling the western pres-
ence amid the disorienting alleys and courtyards of the district. But while 
this story may seem to have come from recent headlines in Iraq and Afghan-
istan, it is instead a glimpse into an event known as the “Battle of Crater,” 
fought between British and Aden insurgents in June 1967. 
INTRODUCTION
The British colonial experience in Aden came to a swift end in November 
1967, shortly after the events of the Aden mutiny, and with the complete 
dissolution of the federal government Britain had spent decades trying to 
create in South Arabia. After 130 years of colonial presence, and a concerted 1
2 POST-WORLD WAR II AND ADEN Scott Smitsoneffort at “nation-building” throughout the post-World War II era, the British 
strategy had failed. This case explores why the strategy failed and what les-
sons can be learned from the British experience for modern-day nation-
building.
Historical Background: Why the British Were in Aden
Situated at the choke point between the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean, 
Aden lies at the southwestern corner of the Arabian Peninsula.1 As both a 
seaport and a city, Aden has a deep natural harbor and sheltered inlets that 
make it an ideal location for trade as well as for control of key shipping 
lanes.2 Recognizing the strategic importance of Aden, the British seized con-
trol of the battlements and harbor of Aden in a quick and decisive engage-
ment on January 19, 1839, providing the British East India Company a 
major presence in the Middle East and effectively establishing British con-
trol over Aden for decades to come.3
Long-standing rivalries with the French and the Russian empires were 
heightened by these empires’ extensive forays into North Africa and the 
Middle East later in the nineteenth century, making Aden a strategic outpost 
for the British Empire.
Moreover, the building of the Suez Canal, which opened to shipping in 
1869, only increased the importance of Aden, as control of Aden’s port 
enabled the British to control all seaborne shipping passing in and out of the 
Red Sea. The discovery of oil in the Middle East, coupled with the decision 
of the Royal Navy to switch from coal to oil, made the maintenance of Aden 
as a colonial outpost and lynchpin of the British Empire all the more impor-
tant, to include the prosecution of the Allied war effort during World War II. 
POST-WORLD WAR II AND ADEN
Despite coming out on the winning side of the war against the Axis powers, 
the British Empire after the war was anything but dominant. The cost of two 
global wars in the first part of the twentieth century had effectively bank-
rupted the empire, leading to what an advisor of the Labour government 
referred to as a “financial Dunkirk.” In essence, the British had two options: 
either withdraw from its numerous overseas obligations or face a greatly 
reduced standard of living at home. 
With this stark choice at hand, the Labour government began to craft 
policies for their overseas possessions. The Colonial Office published a doc-
ument in 1948 stating that the “central purpose of the British colonial policy 
is simple. It is to guide the colonial territories to responsible self-govern-
ment within the Commonwealth in conditions that ensure to the people 
conquered both a fair standard of living and freedom from oppression in any 
quarter.”4
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prime minister), Clement Attlee, noted that when considering postwar colo-
nial policy, “the colonial problem will not be solved by a combination of an 
eye to business and humanitarian sentiment. Nor on the other hand will it 
be solved by looking backwards and reimagining that we can recreate the 
conditions of a past age. Britain must . . . set aside sentimental imperialism 
and take a realist view of our problems.” More specifically, when considering 
the colonies “East of Suez,” Attlee maintained that the colonies consisted of 
“a group of people on the way towards self-government requiring tutelage 
for many years yet and susceptible to much economic development which 
should be directed primarily to the welfare of the indigenous populations 
and to the general service of the world.”5
Additionally, the colonial policies drafted in the post-World War II years 
sought to create some process of constitutional reform; development of the 
political, social, and economic sectors; the creation of a strong, self-sustain-
ing government; and the eventual independence of the colony. In the Aden 
context, policy ideas for decolonization and the creation of political institu-
tions came from career diplomats and colonial officers in the form of some-
thing called the “Forward Policy.” This policy was seen by its creators as a 
“prelude to an attenuated form of self-government . . . [because] the region 
required a period of formal British tutelage prior to independence. After the 
demission of authority, Britain’s impact would still be evident in the form of 
the institutions and ideology which had been implanted.”6
One coauthor of the “Forward Policy,” Sir Kennedy Trevaskis, who 
would become advisor for the West Aden Protectorate in 1951, commented 
that the policy’s main task was “to construct ‘states’ out of the loosest and 
most fluid tribal considerations imaginable.” But despite his enthusiasm and 
belief that the “Forward Policy” could be successful in achieving the colonial 
policy outcomes set forth by the British government, Trevaskis knew that 
“state building” would in no way be easy in the South Arabian context. He 
asserted that “there was so much that was unusual or anomalous to compre-
hend—the distinction between states with advisory treaties and those with-
out; between rulers who ruled and those that did not; the differing degrees 
in which advice and control were employed in different states; the intricate 
web of feuds and rivalries in which every state, tribe, or clan seemed to be 
enmeshed; and, brooding over the whole battlefield of conflict and confu-
sion, the dark continuing shadow of the Yemen’s claim to South Arabia.”7
But as John T. Ducker, a career civil servant with extensive experience in 
the Aden Protectorate during the 1960s, explains, the difficulty was that 
decolonization policies “were all based on the premise that there would have 
to be a degree of consent [from the indigenous population] and that the 
state involved would have to be viable, implying both reasonable competent 
government and economic viability at an attainable level.” Ducker was 
rather pessimistic about the prospects of a successful decolonization: 
“[C]onsent implied electoral systems, with an agreed franchise, then almost 
totally absent, and normally implied the transfer of power from traditional 
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Competent government implied a level and depth of education, which was 
not present in most colonies, despite considerable advances. Economic via-
bility gave rise to questions and answers, which differed from territory to ter-
ritory according to the resources of each. Some economies were primitive, 
including, it has to be said, much of the Aden Protectorate.”8
NASSER, SUEZ, AND THE COLD WAR
At the time when the British were struggling with how best to plan, control, 
and execute decolonization in line with their stated aims, the Cold War 
moved into full swing and Arab nationalism took over much of the Middle 
East. As the successful leader of the Egyptian Revolution of 1952, Gamel 
Abdul Nasser became Egypt’s second president in 1956, heralding a new 
period of modernization and socialist reform and advancing the idea of pan-
Arab nationalism, including a short-lived union with Syria.9
Nasser was revered throughout the Middle East, as he was the first 
native-born Egyptian leader in 150 years, had forced British troops out of 
their respective Suez Canal bases, obtained arms and aid from the Soviet 
Union, and actively sought to promote Egyptian leadership in the Arab 
world and expunge any and all influence of the West, to include the colonial 
interests of the British, from the Middle East.10 As a result, in 1957 Nasser 
nationalized the Suez Canal and successfully withstood a combined Anglo-
French attempt to seize it back militarily. In 1962, in an attempt to expand 
his influence on the Arabian Peninsula, Nasser intervened in the Yemen civil 
war, placing tens of thousands of troops in a state that shared a border with 
the Aden Protectorate. 
The Conservative Party and Imperial Concerns
Meanwhile, the Suez crisis significantly impacted domestic politics in the 
United Kingdom, bringing about the removal from power of the Labour 
Party and the selection of new Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, a member 
of the Conservative Party. Shortly after taking office, Macmillan initiated a 
thorough review of the British Empire, specifically focused on the ongoing 
constitutional and political developments in the colonies. This review 
argued for the need to retain Aden as a strategic asset but recognized the 
need for continued assistance and political development (see textbox 1).11
The Conservatives feared that the rising Arab nationalism increasingly 
championed by Nasser could provide the Soviet Union an opportunity to 
gain traction in the region, reinforcing the new government’s conviction of 
the central importance of retaining British colonial outposts in the Middle 
East, especially Aden.12
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Textbox 1. Findings of the Conservative Party’s Review of Aden, 1957
(i) Taking strategic, diplomatic, and economic considerations together, Her Maj-
esty’s Government has a strong interest in retaining control of the Colony of Aden, 
which could by progressive stages attain a high degree of internal self-government, 
but Her Majesty’s Government cannot in the foreseeable future consider the grant 
of self-determination.
(ii) From the point of view of Her Majesty’s Government’s interests, the Protected 
States have mainly to be considered in relation to the protection which they afford 
the Colony; in this sense, the only policies which must be absolutely rejected are 
any which would be likely to lead to the absorption of these States by the Yemen 
and Saudi Arabia.
(iii) Her Majesty’s Government has, however, because of its treaties, and for general 
historical reasons, strong obligations towards these Protected States, which equally 
lead to the impossibility of allowing them to be absorbed by the Yemen or Saudi 
Arabia, and make it the duty of Her Majesty’s Government to continue to develop 
them economically and socially so that they may eventually be able to maintain 
their independence vis-à-vis the Yemen and Saudi Arabia without outside support.
Source: as quoted in Hinchcliffe, Ducker, and Holt, Without Glory in Arabia, p. 17.The Characteristics of Aden, the West Aden Protectorate (WAP), 
and the East Aden Protectorate (EAP)
Although all under the auspices of the British Colonial Office, the region, 
known as “Southern Arabia” was divided into three separate protectorates, 
each with different social, economic, and political challenges and responsi-
bilities:
1. Aden itself was a cosmopolitan, commerce-dependent seaport that at 
one point was the world’s third busiest port, serving as a major pro-
vider of oil to passing ships that readily took advantage of the nearby 
Suez Canal. Most of the citizens of Aden Colony were highly edu-
cated and served in many professional positions within the colonial 
bureaucracy. The colony already had some level of political institu-
tions, as it had an elected municipal government and a Legislative 
Assembly. Aden also was home to many transient Yemenis who were 
not granted outright political rights in the existing political frame-
work. This sizeable minority within the seaport would serve as a 
major roadblock in developing a lasting constitution as efforts to cre-
ate an independent Aden moved forward. 
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existing structures of law and order that could provide any frame-
work for a future constitutional order.13 The WAP states were 
located between Aden Colony and Yemen, which served as the stag-
ing ground for thousands of Egyptian troops fighting in the Yemen 
civil war. In addition, for many previous decades, an imamate in 
neighboring Yemen had laid claim to Aden Colony, a claim that con-
tinually threatened the entire British nation-building enterprise. 
3. The East Aden Protectorate was much more independent and politi-
cally and economically self-sufficient than Aden in its governing 
structures, as a sultan presided over six separate governorships, main-
tained a peace accord between the urban centers of the EAP and the 
rural tribes that could at times threaten overland commerce, 
enforced law and order within the EAP, and utilized existing social 
structures to provide a tangible governing framework. 
Given these significant differences between the three protectorates, it 
proved extremely difficult to reach a political consensus between British and 
Protectorate powerbrokers for creating and implementing an enduring con-
stitutional and governing framework.14
The Trevaskis Plan
Under the guidance of Kennedy Trevaskis, advisor for the WAP, a plan was 
initiated that sought to create a federation in combining states from both the 
East and West Aden Protectorates; this federation would be headed by the 
governor of Aden and would, in function, be a quasi-independent form of 
government that would set the conditions for eventual British withdrawal 
(but would not include Aden Colony). But Trevaskis’ plan was widely 
denounced. The South Arabian League (SAL), a collection of nationalists, 
elites, and intellectuals that sought a unified South Arabia, rejected the plan 
because it ran contrary to its own goal of creating a single, unified South Ara-
bian state that would include Aden and both the East and West Aden Pro-
tectorates. Nevertheless, the organization still wanted to participate in the 
dialogue of constitution-building. However, engagement with the SAL from 
the Colonial Office was decreased following the inability of the British gov-
ernment to reach a consensus on how best to incorporate the varying enti-
ties of Aden, the EAP states, and the WAP states. Increasingly marginalized 
in subsequent negotiations, the SAL turned to Yemen and Egypt for sup-
port. Trevaskis bluntly stated that the SAL had “lost faith in our inten-
tions.”15
In addition, “at almost the same time as Cairo Radio began to speak the 
tones of revolutionary Arab nationalism, the development of cheap, trans-
portable transistor radios created a mass audience among the poor and the 
remote. Men who had long lived in isolation now found a common political 
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tudes in their own land and across the Arab world . . . Aden’s government 
had to try to meet this challenge but it was ill equipped to do so.”16
Moreover, forces within Yemen began to funnel arms and supplies into 
the West Aden Protectorate to local tribesmen to incite violence and further 
aggravate security in the WAP.17
One observer noted the difficult position the leaders of the Protectorate 
states found themselves in when assessing the Trevaskis plan, stating that 
“the initial response from the rulers was favourable.” However, the scheme 
did not get off the ground. The proposed federation implied considerable 
loss of autonomy by the rulers in favor of the federal institutions, for which 
some of them were not ready. 
In the EAP, there was difficulty in balancing the separate interests of the 
smaller states with the much larger Quaiti State. 
In the WAP, some rulers also feared it might be a subterfuge to detach 
the Protectorate from Aden, which was not to be included at that stage. 
Some wondered if Britain would stand by them if they took a step they knew 
would incur the wrath of Yemen and Cairo Radio. The imam of Yemen 
attacked the scheme, perhaps because he feared it might extinguish forever 
his claims to territory in the WAP. Egypt opposed the scheme because of the 
British sponsorship.18
Finally, the British government continued to debate the “Aden ques-
tion” endlessly, throughout the 1950s and ‘60s, with the Conservative Party 
reinforcing the needs of retaining Aden for strategic flexibility “East of 
Suez,” while the Labour Party continually argued for the immediate relin-
quishment of Aden to the indigenous population. The theme of Labour’s 
feelings of limited military presence is epitomized by the following quote 
from a leading member of Labour during the period: 
“The first of these limitations is that we should not seek to maintain military 
facilities in an independent country against its will. The second is that we 
should not accept commitments to give military support to a country unless 
that country provides us with the facilities we require to make our support effec-
tive in time. The third is that we should not attempt to maintain a capability for 
carrying out major military operations entirely alone and without allies. I do not 
believe that, even if it were economically or militarily possible for us to avoid 
accepting these limitations, it would be politically wise for us to seek to do so. In 
particular, to seek to maintain military facilities in an independent country 
against its will can mean tying down so many troops in protecting one’s base 
that one has none left to use from it. The base then becomes a heavy commit-
ment in itself and loses all its military value.”19
While Labour’s views were tied to economic concerns, the Conserva-
tives continued to espouse the importance of Aden in a geostrategic context:
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the world. . . . There is a major airfield, an important refinery, . . excellent train-
ing grounds and, above all, a major stockpile which enables us to pack a heavy 
punch, if we should need to, anywhere in the western part of the Indian Ocean.
  The value of the base has been proved more than once. We based our oper-
ations in Muscat on it. We organised the safety of Kuwait from it. We prevented 
the expansion of the three East African mutinies from it. The Secretary of State 
for Defence said yesterday that we did not need that base to carry out our com-
mitments outside South Arabia. I wonder whether he is right. I do not know 
how without Aden he will be able to go to the help of our numerous Common-
wealth partners in East and Central Africa. I am not quite clear how in a real 
emergency he will be able to help the Persian Gulf.”20
Seeing the vigorous rejection of the Trevaskis plan by foreign elements 
within and outside of the Protectorate, coupled with the deadlocked views 
of the way forward with decolonization of Aden in the British parliament, 
the British government had to review its policies on the direction of political 
development in Aden. Reappraising British policies in Southern Arabia, the 
prime minister’s cabinet Colonial Policy Committee recommended the fol-
lowing in March 1956:
• The colony of Aden could progressively attain a high degree of inter-
nal self-government though not, in the foreseeable future, self-deter-
mination on account of Aden’s strategic military importance;
• Any policy that might lead to the absorption of the protected states 
by Yemen or Saudi Arabia must be absolutely rejected;
• Her Majesty’s Government had a strong obligation to continue to 
develop the protected states;
• The future independence of those states would very likely need some 
form of closer association;
• The governor should continue discussions with the rulers about such 
forms of closer association, which should also address the questions 
of management of any future oil revenues.21
While this colonial governing policy document demonstrated the British 
government’s logic for decreasing the pace of the decolonization process 
(though decolonization was still a stated objective), the British military 
drafted new, strategic planning documents in 1958 that increased the impor-
tance of Aden to the overall strategic framework of the empire. The 1958 
Defense White Paper moved the general headquarters of the British Middle 
East Command from Suez and Cyprus to Aden; Aden was now the com-
mand location for all the British air and land forces in the “Arabian Penin-
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also implemented the concept of “commando carrier” groups that would 
provide strategic flexibility throughout the Indian Ocean, with one “com-
mando carrier group” based in Singapore, the other in Aden. 
Sir William Luce’s Warnings
That same year, Sir William Luce, the governor of Aden, began signaling 
that all was not well in Southern Arabia, and in fact the policy direction in 
Aden and the Protectorates should be reversed, not necessarily accelerated. 
First, in April 1958, Luce warned that “we now have on our doorstep two 
powerful influences—both hostile; and we must assume that both Russia 
and Egypt will support and exploit the long-standing ambition of the Imam 
to secure Yemeni domination of both the Aden Protectorate and Colony.”22 




Luce recommended the third option, but he felt that it would take nearly 
a decade to withdraw from the Arabian Peninsula in a manner that sup-
ported Aden Colony and the Protectorates so that they could remain a via-
ble political entity after the British colonial and military presence had 
ended.23 He suggested that the British should withdraw completely from the 
Middle East, more closely align themselves with representatives of the Arab 
nationalist movement, and thereby set the conditions for favorable relations 
with Arab countries in the future. 
Luce argued that the only suitable “end game” in the disengagement 
from the Arabian Peninsula was the establishment and implementation of 
some sort of comprehensive governing structure that included both Protec-
torates, as well as the Aden Colony. Doing so would require a significant 
investment in British fiscal, military, and diplomatic capital as well as a rec-
ognition that any continued British military presence in Aden Colony had to 
come solely at the discretion of Aden political elites.24 
The Conservative Reaction to Luce
The withdrawal recommendation sent shock waves through the Conserva-
tive Party. The Colonial Policy Committee decided Aden was too important 
in the existing British strategy to give up; Aden was essential to the British 
military’s role in maintaining a presence in the Middle East and the Indian 
Ocean to counter the threat of Soviet influence. 
10 THE FEDERATION OF SOUTH ARABIA Scott SmitsonTo reinforce this policy in the Middle East, a communiqué was sent 
from the secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the various heads of mis-
sions of British embassies throughout the region (see textbox 2), outlining 
the strategic objectives of the British government, which at the time was still 
controlled by the Conservative Party:25
• Stability in the Persian Gulf to facilitate the production, refining, and 
flow of oil into international markets;
• Support for the large, British commercial interests in the oil industry;
• Continued access through the Suez Canal and through over-flying 
rights to facilitate trade and the deployment of the armed forces in the 
Indian Ocean region, including South East Asia;
• In concert with the USA, minimization of Soviet influence exercised 
mainly through relations with Egypt, Syria, and Iraq.26
It was apparent that British strategy heavily relied upon the continued 
use and presence of overseas basing of their military forces in the Middle 
East. While diplomats in Aden continued to work toward an eventual hand-
over of control from the Colonial Office to the Aden citizenry, the British 
military significantly increased its footprint in the colony, so much so that 
troops were shifted from traditional basing areas such as West Germany to 
Aden to be utilized in operations in East Africa and Kuwait.
For the Tories, no merger of Aden Colony in the Protectorates was po-
litically feasible for the foreseeable future; any proposed “Aden Federation” 
had to come from the Protectorate states themselves. The colonial secretary 
at the time, Alan Lennox-Boyd, argued that the British government had to 
“secure Aden Colony as a military base for as long as possible . . . and . . . 
could not allow the merger of the Colony [Aden] and the Protectorate/Fed-
eration at that time. . . . Time would be needed to accomplish a merger given 
the different stages of development of the parties . . . although Aden politi-
cians and Protectorate rulers wanted to merge Aden into the Federation, 
they did so for very different reasons and they totally underestimated the 
difficulties which would arise.” 
Comparing sentiment in the government with sentiment in the field, it 
became quickly apparent that “there was a basic incompatibility between 
Her Majesty’s Government’s desire for the military facilities in South Arabia 
and the policy of creating a viable state to hand over at independence.”27
THE FEDERATION OF SOUTH ARABIA
The British government’s decision to continue its drive toward a federation 
of states in the Aden Protectorate, absent Aden Colony itself, was boosted 
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Textbox 2. Policy Guidance from the Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs for Middle East Policy
First, we believe that each country in the Middle East should be left to choose its 
own road to salvation, free from outside interference. Our object is to work with 
whatever governments are in power, or come to power, on the basis of such com-
mon interests as exist between us, and to help them within the limits of our means.
Second, we should accordingly abstain from any interference in the internal affairs 
of Arab states and from Arab quarrels, except to the extent to which our special 
responsibilities may make it, exceptionally, necessary.
Third, we must make it clear that where we have special responsibilities and so long 
as we have them we intend to carry them out. Our action should be prompt and 
effective, and the minimum necessary to achieve our purpose.
Fourth, we must accept Arab nationalism and ‘Nasserism,’ which is one manifesta-
tion of it, as a fact of life. We must take account of it and adopt as sympathetic an 
attitude as is compatible with British interests.
Fifth, we must avoid any general anti-nationalist, anti-Nasser, or anti-revolutionary 
posture, both because it would provide Arab nationalists, even though they may be 
working against us, with a convenient target against which to rally other Arabs 
against the West and to inflict greater harm on our interests.
Sixth, we must continue to keep in close touch with the United States Government 
and ensure that our policies are coordinated and each properly understood by each 
other.
Source: Gavin, Aden Under British Rule, pp. 340–341.when on February 11, 1959, six West Aden Protectorate states joined the 
Federation of Arab Emirates of the South (Federation of South Arabia) and 
adopted a constitution giving each state legislative and executive representa-
tion. Additionally, the Federation of South Arabia and Britain signed a 
“Treaty of Friendship and Protection,” which laid out plans for British finan-
cial and military assistance in an effort to help the Federation achieve full 
independence; coupled with this development agreement was a promise by 
the British to protect the Federation from both foreign and domestic 
threats.28
Structural Issues of the Federation Constitution
Nevertheless, Trevaskis criticized that “the Federation existed only in agree-
ment on a constitution. There was no federal government and no federal 
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chair. . . . What they [the Federalists] had in mind was something in the 
nature of the Arab League and based on the principle of the absolute equal-
ity of all states in everything; . . . what emerged out of months of argument 
was a cross between our two concepts: an unattractive hybrid, but some-
thing which was a good deal better than nothing and which, one hoped, 
would be later improved.”29
Trevaskis stated that “the Constitution provided for a Legislature, called 
the Federal Council, in which each state would be represented . . . and a 
Cabinet of ministers or Supreme Council on which each state would be rep-
resented by one minister. . . . There was to be no President or Prime Min-
ster. . . . Reliance on the collective leadership of ministers, representing 
separate states, the appointment of ministers on the basis of states and rep-
resentation in the Federal Council on the principle of equality were regretta-
ble but unavoidable weaknesses, which I hoped would fall away with time.”30
The Federation construct had other weaknesses as well: First, it 
entrenched the power of existing political elites (i.e., sheiks, tribal leaders, 
and sultans) without specifying how to reconcile power allocations between 
the elected and the traditional leadership.31 Second, it relegated the author-
ity and responsibilities of British political officers from “state building” to 
“state repairing” by placing the focus on overcoming the weaknesses in exist-
ing government forms in the Protectorate states rather than guiding the cre-
ation of a completely new political institution. 
One observer noted that “administration had given away to politics and 
in this field the colonial officials were limited by their inability to make any 
mass ideological appeal which could compete with that of their nationalist 
opponents. Federal rule consisted of an amalgam of autocratic commands 
through British-created administrative structures, and political manipula-
tion of traditionally-determined social mechanisms.”32
Another observer concluded that “the Federation never assumed an 
effective political identity. It remained what it had been at the start, an aggre-
gation of interested individuals and groups, united not so much by a positive 
feeling as by fear of common enemies.”33
ADEN INTO THE FEDERATION
As negotiations commenced, it became clear that these disjointed British 
policies created new challenges. Aden Colony was, in every aspect, vastly 
different than the Protectorate states in the West Aden and East Aden Pro-
tectorates. First, British colonial elements had to find a way to convince 
Aden’s indigenous political elite to join the Federation of South Arabia. Sec-
ond, it had to be determined what level of representation Aden Colony, as 
the most significant member of the Federation, given its population size, 
economic might, and advanced levels of governing institutions, would have 
in both the executive and legislative councils of the Federation.34
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To address the first issue, the number of representatives to Aden Colony’s 
Legislative Council was increased and their term extended from four to five 
years. In addition, a position of “chief minister” was created, and the estab-
lished Executive Council was renamed the “Council of Ministers.”35
The second issue, determining who would be eligible to vote in Aden 
Colony elections, proved to be a major hurdle. Although British records 
estimated that Aden Colony’s population was quickly approaching the 
250,000 mark, the right of suffrage was only extended to those who were 
born in Aden, British subjects, or protected subjects who had lived in the 
colony for at least seven of the previous ten years. In the end, only 21,500 
people out of 180,000 were eligible to vote, and only 6,000 of those eligible 
cast a vote at all. One group left out of the political process was large num-
bers of migrant workers of Yemeni descent who had lived in Aden Colony 
for years, and in some instances decades, for fear that these immigrant 
groups could become influenced by the anti-British forces in Yemen and 
retard British efforts in the colony.36
Complicating issues further was the fact that the bulk of the labor that 
worked in the key industries of Aden Colony were Yemenis who were highly 
organized and heavily opposed to the inclusion of Aden Colony into the 
Federation of South Arabia. Leading the dissent of the workers were the 
trade unions, specifically the Aden Trade Union Congress, and its political 
wing, the People’s Socialist Party. 
The period between 1959 and 1963 saw a marked increase in political 
demonstrations, mass protests, and highly effective and debilitating strikes 
organized by the Aden Trade Union Congress. One such strike in 1963 
nearly collapsed operations on the British military base in Aden, as striking 
workers shut down the supply distribution operations.37
Opposition to the inclusion of Aden Colony into the Federation of 
South Arabia continued to come from the British Labour Party, which 
increasingly voiced its dissent and disapproval with the myriad of initiatives 
undertaken by the Conservatives due to the persistent Labour claims that 
the British government needed to remove itself militarily and colonially 
“East of Suez.” One Labour spokesman stated that “the major problem for 
the next Labour Government is going to be to decide whether there are any 
real interests overseas which it is going to be both politically and militarily 
possible to protect by force. That is going to entail a total revision of our 
defense policy.”38
It was no surprise that after recapturing control of parliament in 1964, 
Labour should suspend or reverse many of the Conservative Party policies 
in Aden. When violence from the Yemen civil war began to spread over the 
borders into some states in the West Aden Protectorate (now, the Federa-
tion of South Arabia) in February 1963, the British military resorted to air 
raids and artillery shelling to honor their security guarantees with the Feder-
ation states that bordered Yemen. Meanwhile, the United Nations (UN) 
14 FROM POLITICAL TO ARMED CONFLICT Scott Smitsonwas called in to review the incidents and eventually became critical of the 
security and governance initiatives being undertaken by the British govern-
ment. The UN Security Council went so far as to vote for UN Resolution 
1949 that declared that “the maintenance of the military base in Aden is 
prejudicial to the security of the region and that its early removal is therefore 
desirable . . . calls upon the administrating power [implied to mean the Brit-
ish government] to repeal all laws which restrict public freedoms; to release 
all political prisoners and detainees and those that have been sentenced fol-
lowing actions of political significance; to allow the return of those people 
who have been exiled or forbidden to reside in the Territory because of 
political activities; to cease forthwith with all repressive actions against the 
people of the territory, in particular military expeditions and the bombing of 
villages.”39
What had been to that point contentious, though nonviolent, disagree-
ments about the future of the southwest Arabian Peninsula would soon 
transform into an increasingly violent and bloody crisis. 
FROM POLITICAL TO ARMED CONFLICT
For some elements of the Aden political community, dialogue was no longer 
the currency to achieve independence. In the summer of 1963, radical acti-
vists, no longer patient with the negotiation methods used by organizations 
such as the South Arabian League, started the National Liberation Front 
(NLF), openly calling for armed struggle against the Federation of South 
Arabia. In its initial charter, the NLF stated its basic rationale as making “the 
South Yemeni population rise against British imperialism and the ‘forged 
federal unity’ [the British-constructed Federation of South Arabia] which 
only signified separation and reaction.” Founders of the NLF sought to cre-
ate “a nationalist movement of liberation . . . progressive, organized for a 
struggle with a revolutionary ideology . . . which would be based on Arab 
nationalist noble targets.” Outside of its ideological directive, the NLF 
sought to unite existing nationalist and insurgent groups in their efforts for 
liberation and develop a clearly defined “programme for the struggle of inde-
pendence.” The NLF sought to lead, violently if necessary, the contempo-
rary movements against the British and the Federation and lay sole claim to 
the future political direction of South Arabia.40 
The NLF demonstrated its lethal capability in a grenade attack on Sir 
Kennedy Trevaskis, high commissioner in Aden, in December 1963. This 
attack, which Trevaskis survived, signaled the beginning of a bloody terrorist 
campaign in the urban centers of Aden Colony and throughout the Protec-
torate states. By December 1963, the NLF had already been heavily 
involved in funneling arms and creating unrest in the rural, hinterland areas 
of the West Aden Protectorate. This unrest eventually required a massive 
effort of British forces to successfully prosecute a campaign in the Radfan 
mountains.41
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the Federation and the British government also had to contend with the 
Front for the Liberation of South Yemen. The Front was heavily influenced 
and controlled by Egypt, and despite its aversion to the British and the Fed-
eration of South Arabia, viewed itself as a rival to the NLF, so much so that 
the two groups were eventually at war not only with the British and the Fed-
eration but also with each other.42
What had started out as isolated instances of violence quickly became a 
civil war, as the number of armed incidents in Aden Colony alone saw dra-
matic increases in security incidents and casualties. For example, in 1964, 
there were thirty-six recorded incidents of violence in Aden Colony, with 
the deaths of two British military forces and twenty-five wounded. By the 
peak of the “Aden Emergency,” as the insurgency period was called, there 
were at least 2,980 recorded incidents of violence in Aden Colony in 1967, 
as well as 44 British military forces killed and 325 wounded; local civilian 
deaths and Federation troop casualties figures mirrored this upward pro-
gression in deaths from 1964 to 1967.43
As the violence in Aden increased, dissent of a less violent but still signif-
icantly important degree was taking shape in the heart of the British political 
system: the victory of the Labour Party in the British general election of 
October 1964.
THE LABOUR PARTY’S APPROACH
Firmly in control of Whitehall and parliament, the new prime minister, Har-
old Wilson, selected individuals for his cabinet who would faithfully execute 
the policies of the Labour Government: Denis Healy to head the Ministry of 
Defense, and Anthony Greenwood as the colonial secretary. The Labour 
Party Manifesto stated that the new government would seek to reinvigorate 
the powers of the United Nations and conduct a thorough reappraisal of the 
defense establishment, especially within the context of budgeting and fund-
ing. More specifically, the manifesto argued that “the first responsibility of 
the British Government is still to the Commonwealth . . . in foreign affairs 
the most important effort would be to revive the morale and increase the 
powers of the United Nations . . . in defense, a Labour Government would 
see to it that the nation gets value for money on its overseas expenditures 
and as a first step would submit the whole area of weapons supply to a 
searching re-examination in order to ensure that the limited sums available 
are spent on those weapons best designed to carry out our policies and fulfill 
our obligations.”44
Denis Healy, minister of Defense, recalled that at the beginning of the 
Labour government in 1964, when appraising the British role “East of Suez,” 
there was no general role for Aden, but rather “it was related to responsibili-
ties in particular territories which we tried to get rid of as soon as we 
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go’.”45
Almost immediately, Greenwood began to break any ties the British gov-
ernment had with “feudal rulers,” the sheiks, tribal leaders, and chiefs who 
had been integral to the formation of the Federation of South Arabia, and 
instead engaged with elements in Aden who had been hostile to British 
efforts in Aden Colony, namely Abd Allah al-Asnag, leader of the Aden 
Trade Union Congress. Next, Greenwood immediately replaced the gover-
nor of Aden, Sir Kennedy Trevaskis, with Sir Richard Turnbull, an appoin-
tee with experience in creating independent political institutions in British 
colonial East Africa. Greenwood, in what appeared to be a nod to the recom-
mendations of Luce a decade earlier, sought to break ongoing constitutional 
impasses by championing a “unitary state” solution and advocated the 
immediate withdrawal of British forces from Aden. 
As violence in Aden increased, the chief minister of Aden, Abd al-Qawi 
Makkawi, supported the NLF and refused to denounce terrorism. Sir Rich-
ard Turnbull was forced to invoke his emergency powers as governor and 
suspended all constitutional processes in September 1965. Aden was now 
under the direct rule of the British Colonial Office, seemingly as far removed 
from a sovereign, democratic-based governing structure as it had been a 
decade earlier.46
Aden Policy and the Defense White Paper of 1966
Following close on the heels of the decision to invoke direct rule over Aden 
Colony was the publication of the Labour Government’s Defense White 
Paper of 1966, whose goal was “to reduce the proportion of government 
expenditure allocated for defense in favor of domestic expenditure. This 
fundamental decision forced the British government to consider reductions 
in commitments around the world. This determination was accompanied by 
an ideological, almost visceral feeling among some Labour backbenchers 
and politicians that the day of colonies and military bases was over.”47
The Defense White Paper specified that:
To relax the strain imposed on the British economy . . . and to shape a new 
defense posture . . . 
– There would be a 6 percent reduction in Defence, nearly 100 million 
pounds . . . 
– Defence must be the servant of foreign policy, not its master . . .
– Although we have important economic interests in the Middle East, Asia, 
and elsewhere, military force is not the most suitable means of protecting 
them . . . 
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Europe we can act 
 (1) only with Allies 
 (2) only with facilities 
 (3) no maintenance of bases in independence countries against their 
desires . . . South Arabia is due to become independent by 1968, and 
we do not think it appropriate that we should maintain defense facil-
ities there after that happens. We therefore intend to withdraw our 
forces from the Aden base at that time, and we have so informed the 
Federal Government.48 We shall be able to fulfill our remaining obli-
gations . . . by making a small increase in our forces stationed in the 
Persian Gulf.49
Not surprisingly, publication of the white paper produced widespread 
dissent within the British parliamentary system, as well as from high-ranking 
civil servants who had spent years working in Aden Colony and the Protec-
torate during the Conservative government years. Despite vigorous debate 
in parliament, the Conservatives could not stop the vote for withdrawal 
from Aden from passing in the House of Commons in March 1966. 
The announcement of a concrete withdrawal date reenergized the 
efforts of regional actors, especially Nasser, who soon contended that “there 
was an announcement that Britain has decided to grant independence in 
1968. Well then, we shall stay there [in Yemen] until 1968.” 
The leadership in the Federation was now faced with the stark reality 
that there would be no protection from Britain, diplomatically or militarily, 
against the rising forces of nationalism and insurgency within Aden Colony 
and the Protectorate. Those linked with the Federation now had the choice 
of siding with the anti-Federation forces increasingly gaining control of the 
territory, or maintaining allegiance to a governing structure that had little 
caché amongst the population and had no means, militarily, diplomatically, 
or otherwise, to stem the tide of civil war and insurgency consuming the 
Southwest Arabian Peninsula.50
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22 Map 1. British “East of Suez” Strategic Zone of Responsibility (post-WWII) Scott SmitsonMap 1. British “East of Suez” Strategic Zone of Responsibility 
(post-WWII)
Source: Base map obtained from U.S. Geological Survey. http://neic.usgs.gov/neis/bulle-
tin/neic_pcc3_l.html. Labels for Suez Canal, Aden, and Singapore work by author.
The Road to Good Intentions 23Map 2. Middle Easst and North Africa (circa 1963)
Source: Base map obtained from Arizona Geographic Alliance. http://alliance.la.asu.edu/
maps/mideast.pdf. Labels of maps and demarcation of Yemen/Aden, Egypt, and South 
Arabia work by author.
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(circa 1963)
Source: Base map obtained from U.S. Army (Open Domain). Labels of Aden Port, West 
Aden Protectorate, and East Aden Protectorate work by author. 
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